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THE INTERNATIONAL INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTE
However well and elaborately a plan for the pacific settlement of
international disputes may be devised, its machinery will move but
awkwardly unless it is assisted by the lubrication which can be given
only in one way, that is by the rapid and easy interchange of knowledge
of matters of international import such as legal, political, and economic
information concerning the institutions of the various countries. The
success of the League of Nations will be in proportion to the ease
and swiftness with which this knowledge can pass from one center to
another-and the completeness with which it can be mastered.'
'In this connection Article 24 of the League of Nations Covenant is of signi-
ficance: "All international bureaux formerly established by collective treaties
shall, subject to the assent of the contracting parties, be placed under the author-ity of the League; similarly, all Commissions for the regulation of matters ofinternational interest which are set up after the constitution of the -League.In regard to all questions of international 
-interest governed by general agree-
[209]
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A year ago a step of the first importance in the above direction was
taken by Holland. It was appropriate that this move should have
originated in Holland; for there the duties of neutrality were observed
throughout the war with a cool-headed and admirable impartiality.
It is noteworthy that at the Munich meeting of the Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1883, one delegate (M. Norsa) proposed the appoint-
ment of a commission to promote, by means of agreements between
the various governments, acquaintance with the laws of foreign coun-
tries, both on the part of governments and of the citizens of all
nations. The Commission was duly set up and deliberated for two
years. In the meantime M. Norsa drew up a plan for the establishment
of an "International Committee for legislation, with the object of
furthering in governments, in constituted authorities and in the citizens
of the adherent States, a knowledge of the laws and regulations in
force in each of them." This admirable scheme unfortunately was
pigeon-holed for fifteen years. Again in I9OO, at the Third Congress
of Private International Law which met at the Hague, the Austrian
delegate, M. Schumacher, moved a similar resolution, which only
ended in the expression of a voeu.
Matters rested thus until the foundation of the International Inter-
mediary Institute in, 1918. For the objects and intentions which in-
spired the founders we can certainly not do better than go to the
declarations contained in the first number of the Bulletin of the In-
stitute, which I have ventured to translate from the French:
"In what manner can the Institute describe itself as 'intermediary'?
Would it claim to act as intermediary in matters of international poli-
tics ? Certainly not. The new institution, as its founders have well
un~1erstood, ought not to set itself the task of the arrangement of
Europe. It makes no such claim. . .. ,Our Institute claims the title
of Intermediary Institute in the sense that it can act as a link between
those who desire to increase their knowledge of the institutions or the
scientific data of countries other than their own. - It aims at connecting
a number of forces which are seeking each other out across the whole
world. Suppose a person in China wishes to know some fact con-
cerning Spain. Someone in England desires enlightenment about Rus-
sia. Someone in Sweden wants some information about Egypt . . .
our Institute offers itself to them as their intermediary."
And again the following striking words may be noticed:
"Even in time of war men were found to form plans in readiness for
the time when international life would begin again, desiring to be
ready at the moment when better times appeared. Animated by their
ments, but not subjected to the control of international Commissions or bureaux,
the Secretariat of the League should endeavor, if the parties so require and
the Council consents thereto, to collect and distribute all useful information
and to lend all the. assistance which may, be necessary or desirable. The
Council has power to charge the expenses of the Secretariat with those of any
bureau or commission placed under the authority of the League."
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international feeling and their desires for a happier mankind, they were
moved by the idea that it was the duty of Holland to place herself at
the head of the movement. . . . Their plan was as follows: to create
an organization, a kind of central nervous system, by means of which
the furthest countries of the world should be placed within the pos-
sibility of communicating with each other by the most direct means . . .
a clearing house for international intelligence."
The International Intermediary Institute is now in being. The
President of its Council is no less a person than M. Louden, formerly
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in its governing body are
included men eminent in Holland in law, in science and in finance.
Its aim is now governed by Article 2 of the Statutes:
"The object of the Institute is to furnish intelligence on all matters of
international interest, not of a secret or private character, whether it
be regarding international law, municipal or international law and its
application, or questions of statistical or economic interest."
Two particular features of the Institute are worthy of separate
mention. One relates to its machinery, the other to its actual results.
The connecting link between the Institute and the various countries
from which it seeks to draw information is the correspondent. There
is a network of these correspondents all over the world, whose duty
it is to acquaint the Institute from time to time and as and when
called upon to do so, with matters concerning public and private inter-
national law, and the municipal law of the country which they represent.
There is thus placed upon the correspondent a heavy burden; for upon
the swiftness and accuracy with which he supplies the information
which is required of him very much may depend. The facts so
obtained thus go back into the "clearing-house" to be radiated and
disseminated in whichever direction they are wanted.
One very tangible piece of work which the Institute is doing and
which must receive special mention is the quarterly Bulletin which it
publishes and circulates. This Bulletin2 contains information and
original documents of supreme interest and importance to international
lawyers. The first number 3 contains the full correspondence leading
up to the Armistice, the Armistice terms, and the Notes thereon that
passed between the Allied and German Governments in the language,
be it French or German, in which they were originally written. Then
follows a carefully classified survey or digest of decisions, from every
country in the world, on matters of public and private international
law, and mercantile law, with the reference by which each decision can
be identified. This digest covers such topics as "Collision," "Marine
Insurance," "Trading with the Enemy," "Prize law," "Nationality,"
'The Bulletin is written in French.
'January to April, igig.
211
YALE LAW JOURNAL
"Domicile," "Divorce," "Aliens" and such like matters. Here again
the machinery of the correspondents is brought into play, for each
correspondent collects the relevant decisions given by the courts of
the country which he represents over a stated period, and the results
so obtained are welded into a harmonious whole by the Institute when
the reports from the various countries are before it. This number of
the Bulletin is completed by a collection of all international treaties and
agreements made during the year previous, which includes all inter-
national documents and pronouncements concerning Zionism. The
October number is especially valuable, as the collection of documents
which it contains provides in small compass and convenient form all
that is available on every branch of the peace negotiations in Paris, and
what is even more important for the student of contemporary foreign
relations, a complete list of all authoritative or "inspired" communi-
cations in the press of Europe.
Enough has been shown to make it clear that the International
Intermediary Institute is a new force to be reckoned with in interna-
tional law and foreign affairs and in the furtherance of the knowledge
of those subjects which is so vital for the future peace of the world.
The removal of the barriers of ignorance, the mutual interpenetration
of the laws and customs of the countries which, whether they like it
or not, must necessarily co-operate in the restoration of the world, the
ability to obtain, in a compact and accessible form, the outstanding
facts and documents about foreign affairs without which no judgment
is worth forming, all these cannot fail to be highly powerful factors in
achieving that new disposition for which we hope. Herein lies the
merit and significance of the achievement of the Institute. Its pro-
moters have had the penetration to conceive and the courage to perform
their task.
To hand is the machinery by which the work of the League of
Nations can be made living and vital, and it will be a thousand pities
if it is not utilized in the cause of peace. Mention has already been
made of the relation in which similar organizations stand, under the
terms of the Covenant, to the League itself. It is a good omen to note
that a delegation of the League, on a tour of inspection of the various
bodies with international aims, paid a visit to the headquarters of the
Institute at the Hague and fully considered how far it was possible to
turn the work of the Institute to account. Professor Nitobe, speaking
on behalf of the Delegation, referred in terms of high praise to the
usefulness and importance of its work and held out the hope that the
League would enlist its services and organization for the "profit of
humanity." These are excellent words, and it is to be hoped that they
may become realities. The Institute deserves the sympathetic interest
and attention of all those who are concerned with the study of inter-
national law, and who hope that great results must follow from the




NEIGHBORLY CONDUCT versus PROPERTY IN MINERALS.
In Higgins Oil & Fuel Company v. Guaranty Oil Company, Ltd.
(1919, La.) 82 So. 206, the defendant's duty to be neighborly was
upheld and his privileges in using his land to dig for oil were corre-
spondingly narrowed. The defendant had sunk an oil well on his land
which caused air to get into the plaintiff's pump in a well on the
latter's land, resulting in a great decrease in the productivity of the
plaintiff's well. Although the defendant's well was a non-producer
and could be closed without trouble or expense by simply putting back
a plug, the defendant refused to close it. The court discusses both
civil and common-law authorities and decides that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief.
The decision in its delimitation of the point where the defendant's
privileges resulting from ownership cease, and the plaintiff's rights
begin, is in accord with the position taken by Professor Summers in
his article in this number of the Journal.' While agreeing entirely with
Professor Summers' conclusions, the writer suggests that an analysis
distinguishing between plaintiff's rights and defendant's privileges
would have made his points even clearer than they now appear. For
it would seem that courts, at least partly because of the use of complex
conceptions, have taken a long road in order at length to reach a near
goal.
As Professor Summers shows, the development of the law both of
percolating streams and of oils and gases has been in this wise. Courts
have seen before them the interest of the owner of the land where
such minerals are found, and from this view have stated the "absolute
ownership" doctrine, namely, that the landowner is the absolute owner
of the minerals either solid or fluid or gaseous found on or in his land.
This rule was found to do injustice to the neighboring landowner, and
the opposite extreme was then suggested, that is, that one does not
"own!' such minerals until they are definitely appropriated. It does
not seem to have been perceived that ownership was merely a term
referring to an aggregate of legal relations in the "owner" and hence
denoted the number rather than the kind of such relations, nor that
there was no fixed number of such relations beyond which the owner-
ship would be "absolute" instead of "qualified." 2 A realization of this
meaning of the term would have developed that "absolute ownership"
was not inconsistent with certain duties to one's neighbor as regards
the subject matter of ownership. But the courts went to the other
extreme and are only now coming back to the middle view which
recognizes that in the legal relations which go to make up ownership
of oils and gases, there are in both landowner and neighbor duties in
addition to privileges (in the cases often termed rights), as well as
1 (1gIg) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 174.
2 Cook (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 729.
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numerous other legal relations. 3 Thus the landowner has a privilege
and a power of appropriation of minerals in his land, while his
neighbor has a like privilege and power, and each are subject to the
liability to have such appropriation made by the other.- But each
owes the other a duty not to waste or pollute such minerals, and the
courts will enforce this duty.5
It is not suggested that this analysis settles the ultimate question,
which is where the line between the privileges of one and the rights of
the other should be drawn. That question can only be settled by
weighing the arguments based upon public policy and convenience.
It is urged, however, that it does bring the court shortly to this ultimate
question without filming it over by such indefinite terms as absolute
ownership. And therefore the courts should more shortly reach the
necessary result, that is, the decision as to what public policy does
require in this particular instance.
The principal case presented less question on this point than many
others, for there the defendant did not even benefit himself by his
act. In the case of percolating water there is much authority to the
effect that one may be restrained from committing acts which without
benefit to himself deprive his neighbor of such water.6 And this
tendency to give a plaintiff a remedy where the only effect of the
defendant's acts is to damage the plaintiff without gain to the defend-
ant, may be found in the law of torts generally.7 Our ideas of property
may not have advanced to the point where this tendency may be
developed in the case of ownership of the land itself, but it certainly
may be given effect in a case where, as with minerals, the interests of
adjoining landowners seem of equal merit and hence the conflict to
extend the rights of one and the privileges of the other, is the sharper.
C. E. C.
"RENVOI" IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A decision of the French Court of Cassation, known as the Forgo
Case.' raised a problem of the most fundamental importance in the
"There is a middle ground between the existence of an absolute and indefeasi-
ble right and the absence of any right that the law will recognize and protect.
There is room for the existence of qualified and correlative rights in both
landowners." Meeker v. City of East Orange (igo9, Ct. Err.) 77 N. J. L. 623,
74 Atl. 379.
'So stated in the principal case. See also cases cited by Professor Summers,
p. 176, note 9, supra.
'Cases cited p. 184, notes 3o and 31, supra.
' Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co. (I9O4) 163 Ind. 687, 72 N. E. 849,
68 L. R. A. 175, note; Barclay v. Abraham (1903) 121 Iowa, 61g, 96 N. W. io8o;
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer (19o3) 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 9o7; contra,
Phelps v. Nowlen (1878) 72 N. Y. 39; Bradford v. Pickles, L. R. [1895] A. C.
587; Chatfield v. Wilson (i855) 28 Vt. 49. Cases are collected at p. 176, note 6,
supra.
' (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507; (907) 2o HARV. L. Rxv. 262-3.
'Cass. June 24, 1878, Dalloz, 1879, x, 56.
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conflict of laws, to which Professor Labb6 of the Ecole de Droit of
Paris called first attention in an article which, appeared in 1885.2
Since that time a vast amount of learning has been brought to bear
upon this problem-that of renvoi-by the greatest thinkers on the
subject, with the result that the renvoi doctrine stands to-day dis-
credited in the science of the conflict of laws."
The question whether the rules of the conflict of laws should be
understood in the renvoi sense was first discussed in this country by the
writer of this COMMENT in an article, The Renvoi Theory and the
Application of Foreign Law, published in 19o9.4 Since that time the
problem has been explained further by the writer in the YALE LAw
JOURNAL.5
A number of American cases have been based on facts raising the
problem of renvoi but in none of them was the court aware even of
the existence of the problem. 6 The first judicial discussion of the
problem in the United States is to be found in the report of the referee,
Egerton L. Winthrop, Jr., In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement
of the Accounts of Henry Overing Tallmadge, Executor of Coster
Chadwick, deceased, (1919) 62 N. Y. L. J. 215, which has been con-
firmed by the Surrogate of New York County.7
The question involved in the case related to the distribution of the
residuary estate of Coster Chadwick, who had been born of American
parents in New York, in which state they had their domicile. -Coster
Chadwick removed with his parents to France when he was seven
years of age and had lived in France to the end of his life. Under the
facts of the case there was no doubt that he had acquired a French
domicile. Chadwick left a will in which he gave the residuary estate
to an aunt and a cousin, share and share alike. The cousin having
died before Chadwick, the question raised was whether the will should
"Du conflict entre la loi nationale du juge saisi et une loi itrang&e relative-
inent t la ditermination de la loi applicable i la cause (x885) 12 Clunet, 5.
'For the literature, see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 531; Potu, La question
du renvoi en droit international privi (Paris, 1913) in which a complete list
may be found of all the authors who have expressed an opinion with reference
to the question. See also (199) IO CoL. L. REv. 194-196.
'(19o9) Io COL. L. REv. 190, 377.
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5og. The subject has been discussed also by
Professor Ernest Otto Schreiber, a former student of the present writer, in
(I918) 3IHARv. L. REV. 523.
'Dupuy v. Wurtz (1873) 53 N. Y. 556; Harral v. Harral (1884, Ct. Err.) 39
N. J. Eq. 279; Lando v. Lando (1910) 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. 1125; Guernseyv.
Imperial Bank of Canada (I911, C. C. A. 8th) 18 Fed. 300; Bell v. Riggs (1912)
34 Okla. 834, 127 Pac. 427.
'The writer has been informed by Messrs. Wilder, Ewen & Patterson, attor-
neys for the executor, that no appeal will be taken from the order of the Sur-
rogate, so that such confirmation can be regarded as the final decision in this
case.
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be construed according to French law or according to New York law.
Under Article io44 of the French Civil Code it was assumed that the
cousin's share in the residuary estate would go to the aunt. Accord-
ing to the law of New York the cousin's share would lapse and pass
under the New York statute of distributions to the testator's brother,
who contested the proposed method of distribution.
As section 47 of the New York Decedents' Estate Law regulates the
disposition of the decedent's property "by the laws of the state or
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death,"
it would seem clear that Article lO44 of the French Civil Code should
control the question of distribution, even though the meaning of the
term "resident" is equivalent to domicile.8 Counsel for Chadwick's
brother put forward the contention, however, that inasmuch as the
French law would apply the testator's national law-in this case the
law of New York-the New York court should make the distribution
in accordance with its own statute. The question thus presented was
the famous renvoi doctrine. What did the New York legislature
mean by the "law of domicile"-in this case French law? Did it refer
to the specific provision of the French law applicable to lapsed legacies
or to the French law in its totality, including the French conflict of
laws with its reference back to the law of New York?
Certain courts and writers have supported the latter theory. So
far as this theory has received support from the courts it has been
given, practically without exception, without their being conscious of
the far-reaching character of their decisions. A natural aversion to
apply a foreign system of law, with which they are not familiar, has
caused them to listen to and to accept without much reflection the
argument, "Why be more of a royalist than the King ?" If the French
law, preferring the principle of nationality to that of domicile, does
not care to be applied, why should the New York judge insist upon
doing so?
The learned referee in the above case was not deceived, however,
by this argument and reached his decision only after a thorough study
of the problem in the light of the best juristic thought on the subject,
both Anglo-American and continental. He saw clearly that logically
renvoi would lead to the following three situations: (i) if renvoi is
a part of the law of New York and not of the French law, a New York
court must apply the New York internal or territorial law; (2) if
renvoi is a part of the law of New York and of the law of France,
either an endless oscillation between the conflict of laws rules of the
two countries will take place or the French internal or territorial law
must be applied; (3) if renvoi is no part of the law of New York, even
though it be a part of the law of France, the New York court must
apply the French internal or territorial law.
8 That the term "resident" meant domicile was held in De Meli v. De Meli
(189o) 12o N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996.
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The conclusion reached-that renvoi was no part of the law of New
York-was based on the following grounds:
(i) The renvoi doctrine is not supported by reason. Logically
applied it leads to an indefinite oscillation between the laws of the
two countries involved. If the New York rule of the conflict of laws,
the lex domicilii, refers to the French law including its conflict of laws,
the lex patriae must be understood as referring to the New York law
in its totality, including its rules of the conflict of laws. The result is,
therefore, an endless reference back and forth,--the application of
lawn tennis in the conflict of laws, which constitutes a practical if not
logical absurdity.9
(2) The notion that the New York court should constitute itself
a French court, upon the theory that it is charged with the adminis-
tration of French law in the same manner as the French court, is
erroneous. The New York courts exist for the purpose of enforcing
New York law, including the New York rules of the conflict of laws.
These rules cannot be changed by French law.10
(3) The desistement theory, developed at length by Westlake, has
little in its favor and the result would be in flat contradiction with
section 47 of the New York Decedents' Estate Law."-
(4) To state accurately the problem in regard to renvoi would seem
almost sufficient to refute the doctrine. The question is: When a
law-giver directs the courts to apply foreign law does he ask the
foreign system to decide what law is applicable or does he seek in
the system the direct solution of the legal question ?12 The con-
struction of a will according to New York law is controlled by the law
of the testator's domicile. For a court to hold that the legislature
meant that the French conflict of laws rule should apply and New York
internal law would be to abrogate the provisions of the statute and
to amend it by substituting therefore the French rule, namely, what
the law of nationality is to govern.
(5) The contention that the acceptance of the renvoi doctrine
would make for uniformity of decision in the different countries in
which the question might be presented for adjudication has been shown
to be unsound in substantially all decided cases.18
(6) The renvoi result has been reached in some English cases, but
usually without discussion and many of them by lines of reasoning
(19o9) 10 COL. L. REv. 197-199; (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 522.
10 (1909) IO COL. L. REV. 197-199; (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 520.
(igoo) 18 Annuaire de droit international, 35-50; Westlake, Private Inter-
national Law (5th ed. 1912) 30; see also (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 513-
518, 523.
(19o9) 1o COL. L. REv. 204-205; (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 522.
See (1909) 1o COL. L. Rv. 205; (x918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 524.
'5
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the logic of which is difficult to follow. It is quite clear that the renvoi
is not yet a fixed part of English law.14
The learned referee summed up his decision in the following words:
"On account of its inconsistency with common-law theories of the
conflict of laws, its fundamental unsoundness and the chaos which
would result from its application to the conflicts arising between the
laws of the states of this country, it is my opinion that the 'renvoi'
has no place in our jurisprudence."
As the above views are in perfect accord with those expressed by
the writer in the articles above referred to, further elaboration of the
same in this place appears unnecessary. Just one word in concluding.
From the standpoint of the modem Italian school, according to which
law has pre-eminently a personal character, there may exist some
justification why the ultimate authority to select the rule of law that
is to decide the case should be vested in the national law, instead of in
the law of the forum, even though such law be that of a foreign
country.15 But it would seem to be obvious that under the common
law of England and the United States r. .uthority vests absolutely
and finally in the law of the st-'e in wnich the court to which the
question is presented sits.' 6
E. G. L.
SERVITUDES-APPURTENANT OR IN GROSS
In a New York case' the owner of a certain tract of land had
alienated a portion thereof to the predecessors in title of the plaintiff,
the deed of conveyance containing the following reservation:
"They also reserve to said Ensign, and he is to have, himself and
his heirs and assigns, all the waste or rubbish stone which may begot
at any time in working any part of the quarries on said premises, and
the right to remove the same at pleasure."
A few years later the grantor conveyed the remainder of the farm to
a certain grantee through whom the defendant claimed title. There
was evidence that the successors in title of the latter conveyance occa-
sionally gathered waste slate from the premises of the first grant.
After the grantor's death his heirs made a conveyance of whatever
interest they had in the reservation, which, through successive con-
veyances, also came to the defendant. There was evidence of non-
" (i90) Io COL. L. REv. 332-344.
'Fiore (igoi) 28 Clunet, 424-442, 68.-704; (igog) xo Cot. L. REV. 2oo.
"'Subject, of course, in this country to the limitations imposed by the Con-
stitution of the United States.
'Mathews Slate Co. of New York, Inc. v. Advance Industrial Supply Co.
(I918) i85 App. Div. 74, 172 N. Y. Supp. 830.
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user accompanied by other circumstances showing an intention to
abandon by the grantor and his heirs. The court held, two judges
dissenting, that the interest reserved was a profit a prendre and not an
easement; that it was in gross and not appurtenant to the land retained,
and that therefore there was an abandonment by the grantor and his
heirs.
The decision whether the interest reserved was a profit a prendre or
an easement had an important bearing on the construction of the
language used in the deed. It has been held that an easement may
be in gross, but as such it is by the weight of authority neither assign-
able nor inheritable.2  Hence if the interest was an easement in gross
it ceased on the death of the person to whom it was originally reserved.
If, however, it was an easement at all the fact that the grantor reserved
it to "himself, his heirs and assigns" would at least strongly indicate
that it was intended to be appurtenant." On the other hand a profit a
prendre, whether appurtenant or in gross, is both assignable and inherit-
able, 4 and the reservation to heirs and assigns would then be without
significance.
"In the first place, an easement is a privilege."" In order that an
easement be appurtenant to land, it is necessary that there be two
distinct parcels of land, each having distinct owners. To both of these
parcels of land the easement relates. An easement further involves
a right in a given person, as the owner or occupant of a certain piece of
land against another given person, as the owner or occupant of
another piece of land. 6 Assuming then the existence of certain oper-
'Jones, Easements (898) 30; Ackroyd v. Smith (1850, C. P.) io C. B. 164;
Boatman v. Lasley (1873) 23 Ohio St. 614; Hall v. Armstrong (885) 53 Conn.
554, 556, 4 Atf. 1I3; Chase v. Cram (i9i6) 39 R. I. 83, 97 At. 481, L.. R. A.
ipi8F 444, 447, note. "In some states, however, an easement in gross may be
created by grant so as to be assignable or inheritable as when the language of
the grant shows unmistakeably that the intention is that the right shall be enjoyed
by the grantee, his heirs and assigns." Jones, op. cit., 31; Goodrich v. Burbank
(1866, Mass.) 12 Allen, 459. See note 3, infra. For a statement of the English
law to the effect that an easement, properly speaking, is never in gross see
Goddard, Law of Easements (7th ed. igio) 9; Holland, Jurisprudence (12th
ed. 19oo) 226.
'Pierce v. Keator (877) 70 N. Y. 419. This argument would lose its force in
those jurisdictions holding an easement in gross to be assignable. There are
New York decisions holding such an easement assignable. Mayor, etc. of
N. Y. v. Law (i89i) 125 N. Y. 380, 392, 26 N. E. 471, followed in Re Anthony
Ave. (igo5, App. Div.) 95 N. Y. Supp. 77. Contra, Post v. Pearsall (1839,
N. Y.) 22 Wend. 425, 432, 433, and the principal case which does not cite the
opposing authorities.
" Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter (1869) 6i Pa. St. 21; Washburn, Easements
and Servitudes (4th ed. 1885) 13; Boatmtn v. Lasley, supra.
'Goddard, op. cit., 5.
62 Austin, Jurisprudence (5th ed. i911) 816. "The land which is burdened with
such a servitude is called the servient land or tenement; that which has the benefit
of it is called the dominant land or tenement. The servitude runs with each of
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ative facts including two distinct parcels of land adjoining each other,
these parcels having distinct owners, these owners having the power
of contracting, an agreement between these owners that A is to have
the privilege of crossing from his land over the land of B, etc., the
result is an aggregate of jural relations (rights, privileges, powers
and immunities). A has the privilege of crossing B's land; B, not
having the power ot revocation, is under a disability, and A has a
corresponding immunity.7
Easements and profits a prendre, when appurtenant, have this char-
acteristic in common that both the benefit and the burden attach to
land and pass to the owners or occupants of each respective piece of
land for the time being, and from each owner or occupant immediately
preceding. With either easement or profit a prendre, B, the owner
of the "servient" piece, has certain rights, privileges, powers, and im-
munities as to that piece. Among these he has rights against X, Y and
others that they shall not come on his land. These parties are in turn
under correlative duties to remain off. But A has a privilege to come
on B's land and B has no-right that he shall not; A has a right that B
shall not interfere, and B has the correlative duty. B's land is not,
therefore, (under the ordinary conception of ownership) solely his.,
A profit a prendre, thus, when appurtenant, involves, as does also an
easement, the privilege in A to enter B's land. But with a profit a
prendre the operative facts and resulting legal relations are somewhat
different.9 The privilege is to take portions of the corpus of the land
of B to be used upon and for the benefit of the land of A, and hence
is accompanied by a power in A to create in himself important rights,
etc., in and to the object severed from B's land.10 In the main case
the tenements into the hands of successive owners and occupiers. Both the
benefit and the burden are concurrent with the ownership of the lands concerned."
Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1913) 401.
' See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAv JOURNAL, 16.
s"For the same reason, a right of servitude is styled by Mr. Bentham a
'fractional right'; that is to say a definite right of user which resides in him or
them who bear the dominion of the subject." 2 Austin, op. cit., 8o4. Compare
the following from Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 385: "We must take it
that easements have become an incident of land by an unconscious and un-
reasoned assumption that a piece of land can have rights. It need not be said
that this is absurd, although the rules of law which are based upon it are not so."
"An easement is a right to do something on, in, or in respect of the servient
land, or to prevent the owner of the land from doing something on, in, or in
respect to his own land. A profit a prendre is the right to take something from
the servient land. This is a cardinal'distinction. There cannot be an easement
to take something from the servient land." Markby, Elements of Law (5th ed.
i896) 210.
"Bailey v. Stephens (1862) IO C. B. (N. S.) 91; Hall v. Lawrence (1852)
2 R. I. 218. B, the "servient" owner, has rights, privileges, powers and im-
munities in rem with reference to his land. Rights that X, Y and others, ex-
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the privilege was to gather "waste or rubbish stone" from the land
conveyed, with power in Ensign to acquire ownership of the stone by
gathering it. It would seem, therefore, that the court was correct in
holding this to be a profit a prendre.
The more difficult question in the case was whether the profit a
prendre was in gross or was appurtenant to the land retained by the
grantor. The decision of this question would decide the main point
of the case as to whether the interest had been abandoned, since if it
was appurtenant the owners of the dominant tenement had used it,
while if it was in gross defendant's grantors had abandoned it. The
opinion reads: "There is no word in the deed expressing an intent to
reserve the waste slate for the farm, or for the grantor as the owner
of the farm." The court then reasons from extrinsic circumstances
(two judges dissenting on this point) that the reservation created a
profit a prendre in gross.
It is submitted that the language of the clause under consideration
should itself, with less difficulty, have led the court to the same con-
clusion. A profit a prendre, when appurtenant, must be for the benefit
of the "dominant" estate, and commensurate with its needs. It must
be-connected with the enjoyment of the "dominant' estate and not be
subjected to commercial purposes."1 It follows that where "all the
waste or rubbish stone" may be gathered the privilege is not admeas-
ured by the uses of the "dominant" tenement." To be sure all the
stone might not satisfy the needs of the "dominant" tenement. Yet, on
the other hand, all the rubbish stone that, under certain circumstances
cepting A, the "dominant" tenant, shall refrain from coming on his land. On
the other hand A has rights against B and all others that they shall not interfere
with his coming on B's land. B has privileges in rein as to the use of the land,
excepting that he has no privilege to interfere with A's entry to enjoy his
privilege. B has powers in rem. He may alienate to X and create in X cor-
responding legal relations, but he has no power (i. e. he has a disability) to
alienate A's interest. B has various legal immunities. Thus, no one has the
power to extinguish, under ordinary conditions, his interest in the land. Yet
with reference to the extent of A's interest he is under a disability and A has,
to that extent, an immunity. It is submitted that a proper conception of ease-
ments and profits a prendre, when appurtenant to land, involves the subtraction
of an aggregate of legal relations from, and the placing of a limitation on, a
still larger aggregate of legal relations, ordinarily incident to the ownership of
a piece of land, of which latter aggregate the former had been a part, and the
adding of this part to an aggregate of legal relations, ordinarily incident to the
ownership of another piece of land, making the latter aggregate greater and
more complex.
"A praedial servitude could exist only so far as it was actually useful in
respect of the land to which it was attached. Thus a man might have a praedial
servitude to dig clay in his neighbor's land in order to make vessels to hold
wine made on his land; but he could not have a praedial servitude to dig clay
in order to make vessels for sale." Markby op. cit., 2o8; Hall v. Lawrence,
supra; Tiffany, Real Property (903) 742.
'Bailey v. Stephens, supra.
221
YALE LAW JOURNAL
might be gathered, if the supply were large enough, might be far in
excess of the needs of the "dominant" tenement, and still its owner,
under the language of the clause being considered, would be entitled
to it.13 The conclusion of the majority opinion that this was a profit
a prendre in gross seems, therefore, to be correct.
ALBERT J. HARNO.
University of Kansas, Law School.
NOTED IN PASSING
Equity, says Maitland at the outset of his Lectures, is the system of
rules that was administered in a certain court thirty years ago. It
was already clear to him that the two systems must ultimately merge.
And since he wrote, the coalescence,-or rather the gradual molding
of the common law to fit the equitable fashion,-has gone on apace,
and still goes on. Witness People v. Hanley (1919, N. Y.) 123 N. E.
663. There one F had fraudulently induced a broker to loan money
on forged stock certificates. The broker turned his check over to his
bank, which in turn created a deposit credit for F in a New York bank.
The accused, a lady whose acquaintance with F "had ripened into
relations which it is unnecessary to state," knew all the facts; she
received money drawn by F from this account, and was indicted and
convicted under the New York statute, for receiving stolen property.
It was pointed out in these pages1 in a review of the same case in the
Appellate Division, that a conviction could be sustained only if the
property received was stolen. But here the thing obtained under
false pretences-stolen, under the statute-was at best a bank credit;
of the proceeds of that credit F would normally be held merely a
constructive trustee; conviction would thus turn upon whether mis-
appropriation by such a trustee was covered by a statute making lar-
ceny cover misappropriation by "trustees of any description." But the
Court of Appeals was not troubled by such technicalities.
"In criminal as well as civil cases the law looks to substance, not to
form. . . .Where money is obtained from another by fraud and
felony, 2 the wrongdoer obtains no title, and the owner may reclaim
it. . . . If such money be deposited in a bank, it still remains the
money of the owner, the bank being a mere depository and . . .the
owner can compel the bank to restore it to him. . . . This credit,"
as between F and the defrauded broker, "belonged to the latter. It
It is interesting to note that the grantee was. under no duty to the grantor
to quarry, and if he did not this would have rendered the reservation of no
beneficial effect.
1 (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 704.
'F had been extradited to Pennsylvania and convicted of forgery; under the




was a stolen credit, and money drawn from the trust company by
reason of it was stolen money." s
There is no question of the wisdom of the conclusion; the criminal law
should reach far enough to hold the lady defendant. But the reasoning
discloses a view of the civil relations of the parties which is full of
interest in its implications. Money obtained by felony is "the money
of the owners" when in the defrauder's hands; so is the bank-credit
for which the defrauder exchanges it by depositing in a bank; so is
the wholly different money withdrawn from the account. Is, then,
the "owner's" right to recover the bank credit vindicable at law? Is
the old-time constructive trustee growing into a mere bailee with power
to sell? Is the court's statement intended to apply to money only; is
the application to a bank credit based on a momentary misapprehension:
that a bank is a bailee of deposited money? Or does it extend to the
proceeds of stolen money generally? Could an automobile purchased
with such money be replevied, at law?
This matter of larceny has received too little attention, particularly
in the education of our youth. When small boys in the gray dawning
of the day sally forth apple-"hunting" into Neighbor Hodge's orchard,
they play safe; they pocket only fallen apples. Who is to save the
youngsters from the constable? We lawyers should teach them not
to steal: "Pick your apples off the trees, lad; that's not larceny !"
One lawyer indeed would have extended this happy rule to free the
apple-picker even from civil liability. His client had picked ten bush-
els off boughs which overhung his land. He was sued for conversion
in Mills v. Brooker (I919, K. B.) 121 L. T. Rep. 254. Of course he
was held; the overhanging boughs were a nuisance; he had the privi-
lege of abating it by severing them; but that did not mean that
boughs or apples became his when severed.
Two recent cases suggest an explanation of the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine which goes some distance toward making its results more
intelligible. 5 In Davis v. Malvern Light & Power Co. (i9I9 , Iowa)
173 N. W. 262, a child had climbed a well-barbed wire fence around
a pole, touched the live wire borne by the pole, and been killed. The
court upheld the direction of a verdict for the defendant; resting its
conclusion on a ground which will find approval everywhere: that a
barbed wire fence did not constitute an attractive nuisance. In Opelt
'Italics the editor's.
"Bartlett v. Brown (i859) 6 R. I. 37; for the extent of the common law rule
and the extent of statutory change, see 25 Cyc. i6; 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 967 and
970.
'The doctrine is discussed (I915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 84.
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v. Al G. Barnes Co. (1919, Calif. App.) 183 Pac. 241, a ten year old
boy at the circus, in order to dodge the -crowd and see the leopard,
had slipped inside the guard-rope round the cage. He was struck by
the beast, and injured. The court, with "grave concern," weighing-
and properly-all the excitement of circus day, yet did not feel that it
could properly reject the trial court's finding that the boy had know-
ingly, without excuse, come within reach of an animal he knew to be
dangerous. The reasoning followed wholly the rules on dangerous
instrumentalities and on assumption of risk. Now it is submitted that
examination and study of the two cases will show the problems
involved to be- identical. Each time that an instrumentality is held to
fall within the attractive nuisance doctrine, the holding amounts at
bottom to a determination that, as to the child concerned, that instru-
mentality was a "dangerous" one, which 'the owner maintained or
operated at his peril; and the holding further amounts, as regards
that child, to a negation in advance of assumption of risk. The
attractive nuisance doctrine, for all its fiction-obscurities, is driving
at a truth: that things may, in fact, be perilous for children which are
not for adults; and that the measure of "assumption" of risk which
operates in law to defeat recovery should not be the same for small boys
and for men--even on circus day. But it is submitted that the Cali-
fornia court's mode of attack must in the long run lead to sounder
determinations, their eyes being open to the policy involved.
There are many questions bf policy with regard to children which
law-makers have found it difficult to settle. It is children and the
problem of them, rather than the weird legal intricacies involved,
which fill the questions of divorce law with perplexity. The troubles
of an ex parte divorce decree in securing recognition outside the state
where rendered have already found discussion in the JOURNAL. 6 But
it remained for a strong dictum in Cox v. Cox (1919, Tex. Civ. App.)
to put a similar twist on the doctrine of res judicata, in such cases,
even though both parties appear to have been before the court which
rendered the prior decree. By that decree the Mississippi court granted
the father divorce and awarded him control and custody of the infant
children. The mother seems to have succeeded in taking the latter
with her into Texas; the father petitioned in that state for a writ of
habeas corpus to obtain their custody. But no, said the court: the
prior judgment may conclusively establish that the father was the
proper person to have had care and control of the children at the date
of that judgment's rendition-but that leaves it fully open to us to
inquire anew as to who is the proper person now.
" (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 88; (1917) 27 ibid. 117, 120; (1919) 28 ibid.
821.
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The question of children, too, was one great consideration at the
base of an interesting extension of the law of annulment in Davis v.
Davis (i919, N. J. Ch.) io6 Atl. 644. The defendant had before
marriage and for six months thereafter concealed from his wife that
he was affected with "hereditary chronic tuberculosis." On discovery
of the facts she ceased to live with him. The court stressed the fact
that not only the wife, but any children, would be subjected to a con-
tinuous danger of infection which made the husband's fraud good
ground for annulment. The decision is a sound extension, in the light
of modern conditions, of the law on venereal disease; and in refusing
to allow six months cohabitation to weigh against the decree, it is a
sound extension of the one other case on tuberculosis, Sobol v. Sobol,7
in which case the fraud was discovered after the first few days. Even
so, however, we are unable to concur with the court in one suggestion
it appears to make: in the main the rule of caveat emptor does seem
to us decidedly to apply to the taking of a husband.
There is a pretty illustration of what one might call caveat contractor
in International Ry. v. Public Service Commission (1919, N. Y.) r24
N. E. 123. A contract between the street railway company and the
City of Buffalo arranged for five cent fares and abolition of transfer
charges, but with a proviso that nothing therein should be "construed
to prevent the Legislature from regulating the fares." That was in
1892. It is hard to believe that that proviso envisaged anything but
regulation downwards. But as indicated by Cardozo, J., "there is
nothing to show, and we have no right to assume" that it "was for
the benefit of one of the parties to the exclusion of the other." So
the Public Service Commission was held to have power to put the
charges up.
Thus the consumer pays. But there is little reason why he should
not pay the fair cost of what he gets. That fact, and others, were
brought into sharp relief in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer (1919)
39 Sup. Ct. 553, in opinions as clear-sighted and cogent as have been
handed down by any court in many a long day. The question involved
was the constitutionality of the Arizona Employers' Liability Act.
That Act imposes on employers in enumerated "hazardous" employ-
ments-including all manufacturing-without regard to "fault," a
liability in compensatory damages for any accidental personal injury
or death due to a condition of the occupation, where the employee's
own negligence is not the cause of the injury or death. This is in
addition to a Compensation Act with a regulated scale of compensation,
and to a common law liability with the fellow servant defense abolished,
7 (1914, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 88 Misc. 277, i5o N. Y. Supp. 248.
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and those of assumption of risk and contributory negligence made
questions solely for the jury. .The continuance of this common law
liability-increased rather than reduced,-the allowance of "unlimited"
damages, compensating for pain and disfigurement as well as for out
of pocket expense and loss of earning power, and the imposition of
the burden on employers qua employers, were the chief points of attack.
Justice Pitney wrote for the majority: That the employer can take
this liability into account in fixing wages, and can increase the cost of
his product to cover it, makes out a rational basis for discrimination.
And the placing wholly on the employer of the financial risk of injury
through conditions of the industry is no more unreasonable than the
rule of the common law which placed it wholly on the employee. "The
act adds no new burden of cost to industry, although it does bring to
light a burden that previously existed, but perhaps was unrecognized,
by requiring that its cost be taken into the reckoning."8  And if the
state has an interest in the prevention of pauperism, it has an interest
in the redistribution of this risk.' The "danger" of extension of the
Act to "non-hazardous" industries is inconsequential: only the losses
inherent in the business as conducted are to be compensated.
And Justice Holmes, concurring:
"If a business is unsuccessful it means that- the public does not care
enough for it to make it pay. If it is successful the public pays its
expenses and something more. It is reasonable that the public should
pay the whole cost of producing what it wants and a part of that cost
is the pain and mutilation incident to production. By throwing the
loss upon the employer in the first instance we throw it upon the public
[but only those who consume the particular goods burdened] in the
long run and that is just."
It seems clear that we have but three courses of action open as
regards an injured workman, assuming him to lack the means of
future self-support. We can let him starve or subsist on private
charity; we can throw his support upon the tax-payer; or we can
add the cost of his support (as, in the economic jargon, an element of
depreciation in one necessary instrument of production) to the cost of
the goods produced, to all who buy and use those goods. As between
workman, tax-payer, and consumer, it is submitted that the consumer
is the man to pay. The only criterion we have of the value of any
industry is: whether there are people who desire its product enough
'Italics the editor's.
'On this question of prevention of pauperism bear also Justice Pitney's obser-
vation (p. 558) that even proper allowance for the employee's risk in the rate
of his wages does not in fact lead to his saving out money for the day of disaster;
and Justice Holmes' remark (p. 567) that there is no more certain way to secure
attention to employees' safety than by making the employer pay for accidents.
Whether the full paternalistic implication of Justice Pitney's proposition is
desirable, remains at least a question.
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to pay what that product costs. How can our industries measure
themselves against each other, until all the costs of production are
"brought to light" and "reckoned in"?
It is eminently satisfactory that so important a case should have been
determined with clear vision of its bearing. Justice McReynolds
(dissenting) remarked pointedly that
"the restrictions [on liberty of contract] imposed by the act of
Congress, struck down in the Adair Case, by the Kansas statute,
declared invalid in the Coppage Case, and by the Arizona statute, held
inoperative in the Truax Case, viewed as practical matters seem rather
trivial in comparison with the burden laid on employers by the statute
before us."
And Justice McKenna puts the issue with equal clarity:
"There is, I think, menace in the present judgment to all rights,
subjecting them unreservedly to conceptions of public policy." 10
But one who believes rights to be the rules of the game of life, meas-
ured by laws and by institutions and in no other way, and who believes
ultimate conceptions of public policy to be their sole basis of existence,
can but be thankful that in the principal case both sides were so clearly
argued, and that, after the argument, that view prevailed which did
prevail.
There was similar cleancut discussion in a recent New York case."
The question there was: what is the meaning of the term "business";
and more specifically, was Mrs. Hetty Green doing business within
the meaning of the New York Tax Law (sec. 22o, subd. 2) when
she was personally investing and reinvesting her own money? Sur-
rogate Fowler for the second time holds that she was not, in spite of a
reversal of his first decision by the Appellate Division. 2  He appears
to believe that the reversal was partly due to the upper court's ideas
as to "economic matters and matters purely of public policy," and that a
court should never "resort to political, or economic theories, always
transitory" in order to define such a word as "business" which standing
alone has no established legal meaning. We submit, however, that
these are very proper sources for determining a question of statutory
"' It fs more difficult to agree with Justice McKenna's views on economics:
that the employer takes all the risks of the adventure, for instance; the objection
to the statute in question was that it threw upon him a risk he had -not previously
taken. So with some of the views expressed on law, as: that "government
cannot afford to infringe. . . . a right of anybody upon money considerations
or for ease in the exercise of its faculties." On the conception of "rights" here
involved see Keller, Law in Evolution, (1919) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 769.
"In re Estate of Hetty R. Green (igig, N. Y. Surr.) 62 N. Y. L. J. 261.
'In re Green (i98, N. Y.) 184 App. Div. 376, 171 N. Y. Supp. 494.
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construction, while at the same time approving the Surrogate's resort
to etymology and the Roman law in his search for a definition. He
rightly says: "To ascertain the meaning of words we must not hesitate
to resort to any source of information, even that furnished by intel-
ligent pedantry." In replying to the upper court the Surrogate does
not disdain to appeal to "public policy" himself. "In democratic
republics, with universal suffrage, the growing danger of injustice
is not to the poor, but to people of property.'3 We should remember
that other great states have failed in the past when the country
swarmed with a consuming hierarchy of extortion, and the receivers
of taxes outnumbered the taxed, who were destroyed under forms of
law." This sounds, in these bolshevistic days, somewhat like the
capitalist's swan song, having for tired ears some of its fabled
sweetness.
" Cf. the recent report of the Carnegie Foundation on Justice and the Poor.
